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DIFFERENTIATING GATEKEEPERS 
Arthur B. Laby* 
INTRODUCTION 
Collective blame for recent business failures has fallen on gatekeepers. 
The conventional view is that auditors, lawyers, underwriters, analysts, and 
others have shirked their responsibilities and permitted illegal conduct. If 
we clarify and enhance the responsibilities of gatekeepers, some say, we 
will avoid such debacles in the future.1 This claim traditionally depended on 
a rational actor model under which a gatekeeper would prevent misconduct 
by a primary violator because the gatekeeper’s expected liability or 
reputational harm from failing to prevent misconduct exceeded the benefits 
gained in fees.2 Because investors understand a gatekeeper would not act 
irrationally, his statements are to be believed.3 While this model has merits, 
it fails to distinguish among gatekeepers, who are likely to respond 
differently to incentives. It also fails to appreciate differences in the 
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 1. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 55 (2003) (noting 
consensus that insufficient deterrence is to blame for corporate scandals); Hillary A. Sale, 
Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 407 (2003) (stating that 
gatekeepers did not do their jobs in companies such as Enron). Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
301, 345–63 (2004) (proposing modified form of strict liability for auditors and proposing 
gatekeeper responsibilities on attorneys), with Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A 
Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 368–74 (2004) (proposing modified strict 
liability limited by contract). 
 2. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, 
Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 317 (2004) (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley accepts a 
deterrence model that “hypothesizes that target decision-making is conducted by comparing the 
cost of compliance with the product of enforcement threats and penalty levels”); Jill E. Fisch & 
Carolina M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct 
Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 524 (2003) (“[T]he reforms of 
Sarbanes-Oxley are principally directed toward improving the incentives and responsibilities of 
gate-keepers—especially accountants.”); Sean Griffith, Afterword and Comment: Towards an 
Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2003) (stating that investors can 
take comfort in gatekeepers’ opinions because firms risk both legal liability and discredit to 
reputation if false); Reinier Kraakman, Third Party Liability, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 583, 585–86 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (stating that 
accountants, underwriters, and lawyers often prevent misconduct, regardless of its returns). 
 3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third Party 
Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 59, 60 (2005). 
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character of a gatekeeper’s relationship with a primary violator and to 
consider whether such differences bear upon gatekeeper behavior.4 
This paper examines gatekeepers by focusing not on their similarities, 
but on their differences. All gatekeepers are not alike. They vary widely in 
the functions they serve, skills necessary for the job, relationships with their 
principals, and duties they owe. There are differences in their approaches as 
well. Accounting determinations, for example, are often formalistic and 
unambiguous, while legal advice is said to be more nuanced, requiring an 
attorney to explore a range of options with a client, who evaluates the 
lawyer’s advice and then makes up her own mind.5 The securities analyst, 
unlike the accountant or lawyer, makes predictions, which are frequently 
wrong.6 Distinguishing among the character of gatekeepers’ evaluations is 
helpful, but it masks deeper differences in the structure of gatekeepers’ 
relationships with their clients. 
This article focuses on one difference in particular that bears closely on 
whether the gatekeeper can be effective: whether, as a normative matter, the 
gatekeeper is meant to be independent of the client, acting as a neutral 
umpire,7 or whether the gatekeeper is meant to be dependent on the client, 
charged with promoting the client’s ends in a fiduciary or similar capacity. 
The label dependent is used because certain gatekeepers depend on the 
client to determine the nature, purpose, and scope of their agency. 
Distinguishing between independent and dependent gatekeepers, 
however, is only a starting point. One also must ask why gatekeepers have 
not been more robust monitors. At least part of the answer is that the 
conventional view of the gatekeeper’s role is inadequate, focusing on the 
actions of a single individual, rather than the dynamics of the group. 
Similarly, until recently Congress, regulators, and courts have relied largely 
on a command and control philosophy of governance, rather than 
addressing biases that can cause one small misstep but lead incrementally to 
large scale disasters. Thus, rather than looking at the gatekeeper problem 
from the perspective of a rational actor, this paper explores it from a 
behavioral viewpoint. 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Kraakman, supra note 2, at 586 (discussing accountants, underwriters, and lawyers); 
Coffee, supra note 1, at 309 (discussing auditors, rating agencies, analysts, investment bankers, 
and attorneys). 
 5. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure: Redrawing the Boundary Between 
Lawyer and Accountant Responsibility 13–16 (Duke Law Sch., Working Paper No. 28, 2005); 
Coffee, supra note 1, at 353 (describing the auditor’s world as “relatively precise and rule 
bound”). Much of accounting is of course nuanced as well. Accounting literature, for example, 
requires the auditor to conclude that the financial statements, apart from technical reporting rules, 
“fairly present” an issuer’s financial position and operations. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 
425 F.2d 796, 805–06 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 6. Coffee, supra note 1, at 353 (“[T]he securities analyst is essentially a prognosticator whose 
predictions about the future are frequently wrong.”). 
 7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1293, 1300 (2003). 
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Advances in behavioral and social psychology demonstrate that 
individual behavior is strongly influenced by others.8 Commenters in this 
area have begun to pay attention to the institutional and interpersonal 
context in which gatekeepers formulate judgments about whether the 
conduct of others is appropriate.9 Joining this chorus, this article maintains 
that dependent gatekeepers, far more than independent ones, perform their 
responsibilities under the yoke of unconscious bias that affects the rigor 
they bring to the gatekeeping task and the accuracy of their judgments. 
Thus, the thesis advanced is that independent agents are better gatekeepers 
than dependent ones. 
Drawing on this literature, however, does not suggest that people who 
make poor decisions or fail to guard against wrongdoing are not 
responsible. It is easier, however, to investigate harm after it occurs and 
assign blame than to conduct a searching inquiry into one’s underlying 
decision process with the aim of improving it.10 Furthermore, this paper 
does not attempt to provide a complete behavioral explanation of 
gatekeeper conduct, but rather raises, for future consideration, whether 
insights from behavioral psychology can be married with the understanding 
of the structure of gatekeeper relationships. 
Part I of the paper distinguishes independent from dependent 
gatekeepers and discusses critical features that differentiate them. 
Gatekeepers are categorized as independent or dependent based on which 
features should predominate, recognizing that this split is not clear-cut and 
some gatekeepers, such as underwriters, share characteristics of both. Part II 
draws on research in the fields of behavioral and social psychology to 
demonstrate that fiduciaries such as lawyers and other advisors are less 
prone to the gatekeeping task than their independent counterparts. Part III 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See generally S.T. Fiske, Theories of Social Psychology, in 21 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 14413 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. 
Baltes eds., 2001) (recording prominent theories in social psychology). 
 9. See, e.g., 11th Annual Business Law Forum, Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: 
Instruction or Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006); Symposium, Corporate 
Misbehaviors By Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside 
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1026–34 (2005) (applying self-serving bias 
and motivated reasoning to inside counsel role); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The 
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1251 (2002); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the 
Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133 
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ 
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 117 (1993); James D. Cox & Harry L. 
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of 
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985); see also Revision of the 
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 76,008, 76,016 (Dec. 5, 2000) (“Two academics presented research tending to show that 
subtle but powerful psychological factors skew the perceptions and judgments of persons—
including auditors—who have a stake in the outcome of those judgments.”). 
 10. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 19 (8th ed. 1999). 
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extends the argument by examining indeterminacy in corporate and 
securities law, which further complicates the gatekeeping role because it 
gives wide latitude to gatekeepers to claim that their principal’s conduct is 
appropriate. This “complex nature” of the law provides a “fertile breeding 
ground for the kind of motivated and self-serving interpretations that 
rationalize unethical actions.”11 Part III then addresses how these 
observations help explain recent reforms and discusses several additional 
potential reforms. 
Understanding recent reforms and suggesting new ones is important 
and timely. Efforts are underway to scale back recent changes in the law,12 
and the direction of future reforms is uncertain.13 Indeed, many commen-
tators have addressed whether recent changes, including Sarbanes-Oxley, 
are worthwhile or have unintended costs exceeding their benefits.14 Over 
the past several years, gatekeepers have received careful consideration as 
corporate monitors and will likely continue to draw attention. 
I. INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT GATEKEEPERS 
A. DEFINING GATEKEEPER 
Descriptions of gatekeepers typically focus on their ex ante role. One 
common definition of gatekeeper is a reputational intermediary who 
provides verification or certification services to investors.15 Another is one 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Kim, supra note 9, at 1030–31. 
 12. Floyd Norris, Trusting Bosses Not to Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at C1; Randall 
Smith, Aaron Lucchetti & Susanne Craig, Wall Street Pushes for Fewer Market Masters—As 
Stocks Revive, Scandals Fade, A Behind-the-Scenes meeting Signals Effort to Reduce Policing, 
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2006, at C1; Jason McLure, Statistics Show Drop in U.S. Prosecution of 
Corporate Fraud, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 2006, at 1 (attributing decline to, among other things, shift in 
priorities to terrorism prosecutions). 
 13. See Hedge Funds and Independent Analysts: How Independent are Their Relationships?: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Hon. Richard 
Blumenthal, Att’y Gen. of Conn.) (urging Congress to expand aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley); id. 
(statement of Marc E. Kasowitz, Senior Partner, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, 
Alliance for Investment Transparency) (“[Congress] should consider whether further steps are 
necessary” to address hedge funds colluding with analysts.); id. (statement of Dr. Howard M. 
Schilit, Founder and Non-Executive Chair, Center for Financial Research and Analysis) 
(recommending PCAOB-type body to regulate analysts). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate 
Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 745 (2005); Jayne W. Barnard, 
Historical Quirks, Political Opportunism, and the Anti-Loan Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 325, 344 (2005); Bernard S. Carrey, Enron—Where Were the Lawyers?, 27 
VT. L. REV. 871, 875 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and 
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 280 (2004); Roger C. Cramton, George 
M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 
VILL. L. REV. 725, 727 (2004); Mae Kuykendall & Elliot A. Spoon, Introduction to Michigan 
State University College of Law Sarbanes-Oxley Symposium: Enforcement, Enforcement, 
Enforcement . . . , 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 271, 277 (2004); Bernd Schunemann, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: A German Perspective, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2004). 
 15. Coffee, supra note 1, at 309. 
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who is “positioned at a critical point in the flow of events” where approval 
is needed before a transaction can close.16 Gatekeepers, however, also 
engage in ex post monitoring designed to uncover misconduct after it 
occurs, initiate an investigation, and report the misconduct or take 
enforcement measures.17 Also, many gatekeepers perform an advisory role 
with respect to structural or regulatory issues regarding a transaction 
without necessarily providing verification, certification, or approval. Such 
advisors are gatekeepers too because we expect them to advise a client to 
avoid illegal conduct. Taking these considerations into account, gatekeeper 
is defined in this paper as a person or firm that provides verification or 
certification services or that engages in monitoring activities to cabin illegal 
or inappropriate conduct in the capital markets. 
B. DIFFERENTIATING INDEPENDENT FROM DEPENDENT 
GATEKEEPERS 
The emphasis on gatekeepers in the financial markets is not new. The 
early securities laws recognized the difference between independent and 
dependent gatekeepers in the context of directors.18 The Securities Act of 
1933 placed responsibilities on gatekeepers such as auditors, underwriters, 
and company directors, and the legislative history to the Securities Act 
highlighted their role.19 In the 1970s, Securities and Exchange Commission 
actions against gatekeepers such as lawyers and accountants were based on 
the so-called access or passkey theory of liability, under which access to the 
securities markets was controlled by certain professionals like lawyers and 
accountants.20 Today such actions often fall under the rubric of “aiding and 
abetting” or “secondary liability,” and the SEC has broad authority to 
impose sanctions against those who aid and abet violations of law.21 This 
                                                                                                                 
 16. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
201 (2004). 
 17. Kraakman, supra note 2, at 585. While not initiating wrongdoing, a gatekeeper may deter 
it or shift its costs away from investors. See id. at 583–84. 
 18. In the Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress placed responsibility on fund directors 
but, in doing so, it required that at least forty percent of a fund’s directors be independent of the 
advisory firm that typically establishes the funds it manages. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000) 
(prohibiting more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors from being interested persons of the fund). 
The statute refers to directors who are not “interested persons,” as opposed to “independent” 
directors. Id. Congress entrusted to the independent directors the principal responsibility for 
protecting the fund’s shareholders. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979). 
 19. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 29, 35 (1959); see also H.R. REP. NO. 85 (1933). 
 20. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 174 (1982). 
 21. 3B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE 
LAW § 14:31 (2d ed. 2006). In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a private plaintiff may not maintain 
an aiding and abetting action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As part 
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Congress amended the Exchange Act to allow the 
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section distinguishes independent from dependent gatekeepers by 
examining the roles of four types of gatekeepers: auditors, analysts, 
lawyers, and underwriters. 
1. Independent Gatekeepers 
Gatekeepers are retained as agents to perform a task or a series of tasks 
for a principal. In the course of doing so, they receive information, as the 
access theory suggests, that puts them in a unique position to evaluate 
whether the principal has violated, or is about to violate, the law. But the 
tasks they perform and the relationships with their principals vary. Some 
gatekeepers are supposed to be independent of their clients in order to 
critically evaluate a set of facts and render an unbiased opinion for an 
unknown audience. The normative qualities of independent gatekeepers are 
illustrated through a closer look at auditors and analysts. 
a. Auditors 
The auditor of a public company should be the archetypal independent 
gatekeeper. Federal law requires that financial information filed by public 
companies be audited by an independent public accountant.22 In the world 
of auditing, independence has a special meaning beyond exercising 
independent judgment required of most professionals. Independence calls 
for independence of the audit client. The Supreme Court contrasted the 
roles of the auditor and the lawyer with respect to independence. In 
deciding whether the work-product privilege applies to auditors, the Court 
explained: 
 The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private 
attorney’s role as the client’s confidential advisor and advocate, a loyal 
representative whose duty it is to present the client’s case in the most 
favorable possible light. An independent certified public accountant 
performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively 
depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a 
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the 
client.23 
An auditor cannot be the client’s advocate. The Court in the Arthur 
Young case concluded by saying that the “‘public watchdog’ function 
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at 
all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.”24 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                 
SEC to bring an action against a person who knowingly aids or abets a primary violation. 15 
U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. II 2002). The provision does not address actions by private plaintiffs. 
 22. Securities Act, Schedule A, Items 25 and 26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25) and (26) (2000) and 
Securities Exchange Act § 17(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(e) (West 2006) require financial statements 
to be audited by independent public or certified accountants. 
 23. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). 
 24. Id. at 818. 
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courts have stated that accountants have disclosure obligations because of 
their “special relationship of trust vis-à-vis the public” and their duty to 
“safeguard the public interest.”25 An accountant who knows of, or 
recklessly disregards, fraud can be liable for aiding and abetting it.26 
The law discourages auditors and clients from developing long-term 
relationships. An auditor’s long-term relationship with a client can 
jeopardize independence, something accounting literature refers to as a trust 
threat.27 Under SEC rules required by Sarbanes-Oxley, audit partners must 
“rotate off” an audit engagement after no more than seven years—
presumably to cut short the relationship between auditor and client before it 
can blossom into a trust relationship that can impair independence.28 
The contrast between auditors and lawyers also is seen by comparing 
rules of imputation used by accounting firms, as opposed to law firms.29 
Unlike accounting firms, law firms have strict imputation rules that arise as 
a result of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.30 If one lawyer in a firm has a 
conflict of interest with respect to a client, the conflict is imputed to the 
firm.31 With hundreds of clients and lawyers switching firms often, conflicts 
easily arise.32 Large law firms manage conflicts on a daily basis by 
imposing procedures to ensure that information gained by an attorney 
regarding one client does not fall into hands of another attorney at the firm, 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 26. In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1442–43 (D. 
Ariz. 1992). 
 27. AICPA Practice Alert 99-1, Guidance for Independence Discussions with Audit 
Committees, May 1999 (Updated through November 1, 2000), available at http://www.aicpa.org/ 
pubs/cpaltr/may99/supp/public.htm. 
 28. Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 
Securities Act Release No. 8183, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6038 (Feb. 5, 2003) (“Under the new rules, 
no ‘audit partner’ will serve on an audit engagement team for more than seven consecutive years, 
and the ‘lead’ and ‘concurring’ partners will be prohibited from serving for more than five 
consecutive years.”). Hillary Sale and Jonathan Macey have expressed skepticism that rotation can 
eliminate client capture. See Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of 
Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
1167, 1185–86 (2003). 
 29. See Draft Letter from Richard I. Miller, General Counsel and Secretary, AICPA, Potential 
Impact of ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Proposal on Professional Service 
Firms: Comparison of ABA and AICPA Rules of Conduct (August 24, 1999) (on file with the 
author) (comparing ABA and AICPA rules regarding imputation, conflicts of interest, and 
confidentiality). 
 30. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003) (“While lawyers are associated in a firm, 
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be 
prohibited from doing so by Rules [related to conflicts of interest].”). 
 31. Id. R.1.10, 1.7(a) (imputing knowledge of one lawyer to every lawyer in the firm). 
 32. In one recent case, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher was disqualified from representing a limited 
partnership in a dispute with a private equity fund because a Gibson, Dunn lawyer, while working 
at another firm, had represented the private equity fund. The court noted the “especially heavy” 
burden to show the conflict should not be imputed. Casita, LP v. Maplewood Equity Partners 
(Offshore) Ltd., No. 603525/2005, 2006 WL 399796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2006). 
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who might be under a duty to use the information for the benefit of another 
client. 
Accounting firms are not so constrained. A conflict by one member of 
an accounting firm will only preclude the firm from accepting an 
engagement if the conflict could be viewed as impairing another member’s 
objectivity.33 Similarly, AICPA rules impose duties of confidentiality, but 
they do not impute the knowledge of one member of the firm to everybody 
else.34 Accounting firms routinely audit the books of competitors or 
companies that have business relationships with one another.35 
b. Securities Analysts 
A second example of an independent gatekeeper is the securities 
analyst. An analyst is supposed to research a company to judge its value as 
an investment.36 The analyst’s role should be to review corporate 
information and present an unvarnished view of the company to investors or 
potential investors. The analyst’s role should not be to advocate on behalf 
of the company, but rather, like the auditor, to objectively analyze the facts. 
Conflicts of interest must be disclosed.37 The Supreme Court noted that the 
analyst’s role in many cases is to expose negative facts the company may 
wish to withhold.38 Like with auditors, long-term relationships between 
analysts and issuers are discouraged. Evidence indicates that the longer an 
analyst follows a company, for example, the more likely he is to evaluate 
the company positively.39 Longevity leads to error. 
The view of the analyst as independent is under attack.40 Over the past 
several years, the principal criticism waged against analysts is that they 
have slowly lost their independence and become adjuncts of the investment 
banking departments of the firms that employ them.41 These criticisms are 
valid and reinforce the view that the norm for the analyst is independence. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. AICPA CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT ET § 102, interpretation 102-2 (1995) (Conflicts of 
Interest). 
 34. Id. § 301.01. 
 35. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 193. 
 36. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003). 
 37. The Securities Act requires that a research firm paid by a company for issuing research 
reports about that company must disclose the nature and amount of the compensation received. 
Securities Act § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (Supp. II 2002). 
 38. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.18 (1983) (noting role analysts play in “revealing 
information that corporations may have reason to withhold from the public”). 
 39. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the Market, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 76, 80 (July 2003). 
 40. See, e.g., Fisch & Sale, supra note 36, at 1043 (“[T]he traditional hands-off approach to 
analyst regulation, which was premised on the theory that analysts functioned as independent 
gatekeepers, is no longer appropriate.”). 
 41. Joe Nocera, The Anguish of Being an Analyst, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C1 
(“[A]nalysts were routinely selling investors down the river by promoting stocks purely to land 
banking business from companies.”). 
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If independence were not expected, analysts would not be denounced for 
losing their objectivity. 
2. Dependent Gatekeepers 
While some gatekeepers like auditors and analysts are supposed to be 
independent of their principal, others are not. Dependent gatekeepers 
provide advice and recommendations to assist a client in meeting its goals. 
They often act in a fiduciary capacity, owing both a duty of loyalty and a 
duty of care to the client. As a fiduciary, these agents must act for the 
client’s benefit, furthering its ends.42 Courts maintain that the essence of the 
fiduciary duty is to act with “utmost good faith for the benefit” of the 
principal43 and “single-mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a 
duty of loyalty is owed.”44 Regardless of the context, fiduciary cases are 
replete with language about how the fiduciary must act to further the 
objectives of the principal.45 
A fiduciary relationship is characterized by values such as longevity 
and mutual trust, and fiduciary cases refer to a close bond that exists 
between the fiduciary and the principal.46 Those same bonds, however, are 
anathema to relationships held by independent gatekeepers, such as auditors 
and analysts. And an auditor is not considered a fiduciary to the client when 
performing the audit function.47 
The differences in the type of relationships independent and dependent 
gatekeepers have with their clients are striking. The characteristics of 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959) (noting that person in a 
fiduciary relationship has a duty to act for the benefit of another as to matters within the scope of 
the relationship). 
 43. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 372 (1983). 
 44. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461 (1989). 
 45. The “first duty” of a trustee is to act wholly for the benefit of the trust. Willers v. 
Wettestad, 510 N.W.2d 676, 680 (S.D. 1994). A company director must act in the “best interest” 
of the corporation. Lien v. Lien, 674 N.W.2d 816, 824 (S.D. 2004). A partner must pursue the 
interests of his other partners. Ashley MRI Mgt. Corp. v. Perkes, No. 1915/05, 2006 WL 27685, at 
***5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006). A company officer violates the fiduciary duty to her employer 
if she fails to act solely for its benefit during the course of her employment. NTSI Corp. v. Nelson, 
No. 54229-0-I, 2006 WL 119119, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2006). 
 46. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 
1999) (stating that “close relationship with the Diocese” gave rise to fiduciary duty); Clark v. 
Bowler, 623 A.2d 27, 29–30 (R.I. 1993) (stating that close loving relationship gave rise to 
fiduciary duties); Broomfield v. Kosow, 212 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Mass. 1965) (finding fiduciary 
relationship where “close business relationship and business friendship” existed between two 
men); Strode v. Spoden, 284 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (stating that family ties 
contributed to fiduciary relationship). 
 47. See, e.g., VTech Holdings, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 348 F. Supp. 2d 255, 
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In New York, the accountant-client relationship does not generally give 
rise to a fiduciary relationship absent special circumstances . . . .”). An accountant, however, can 
become a fiduciary by establishing a relationship of trust and confidence, and by providing advice 
to a client. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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dependent gatekeepers are illuminated by examining more closely the role 
of attorneys and underwriters. 
a. Attorneys 
A prime example of a dependent gatekeeper is the lawyer. Lawyers 
have a special place in the adversary system, which recognizes that conflict 
is inevitable and cannot always be resolved through consensus.48 In the 
adversary system, lawyers are not meant to be impartial. An attorney is 
required to “advance the client’s lawful objectives and interests.”49 Every 
lawyer knows about the duty of zealous advocacy.50 As Geoffrey Hazard 
has written, “A lawyer’s service consists of guiding affairs for the client’s 
private and often selfish purposes, with an eye to legal requirements that 
have been designed for the very purpose of limiting or regulating selfish 
purposes.”51 
The relationship between client and lawyer is akin to an “informal 
partnership.”52 They work together toward a common goal, although the 
client, not the lawyer, ultimately calls the shots.53 This is particularly true of 
in-house lawyers because of their long-term role as employees or subor-
dinates of the client.54 In describing the lawyer’s role, it is useful to contrast 
it with the role of the judge. The traditional figure of justice—blindfolded—
represents the court or the judge, not the lawyer.55 The lawyer, particularly 
in litigation, seeks to achieve success for his or her client to the disadvan-
tage of the opposing client; the judge interposes herself between the two 
positions, seeking justice.56 The judge’s ethical norm is impartiality; the 
lawyer’s is loyalty.57 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic Theory, and the Constitutional Role 
of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953–1971, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 367 (2001) (explaining 
that democratic adversary theory recognizes individuals are all worthy of dignity and respect, 
interests differ, conflict is inevitable, and deliberation will not always yield consensus); see also 
HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 9. 
 49. People v. Reiner, No. B150375, 2004 WL 1171507, at *11 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 26, 
2004). 
 50. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (“[A] lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”). 
 51. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 172. 
 52. Id. at 213. 
 53. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
 54. See Kim, supra note 9, at 1004. 
 55. Stone v. Williams, 891 F.2d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The figure representing justice is 
blindfolded so that the scales are held even, but justice is not blind to reality. Plaintiff therefore 
should have her day in court and an opportunity to have a jury determine the merits of her 
claim.”). 
 56. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 64. 
 57. Id. at 80. 
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Notwithstanding the role of zealous advocate, the attorney’s duty of 
loyalty is not unlimited. Courts and commentators have recognized the 
tension between the lawyer’s fidelity to his client on the one hand, and his 
role as gatekeeper on the other—and lawyers are at the center of the 
corporate governance debate.58 ABA rules provide that a lawyer cannot 
“counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent.”59 ABA rules permit an attorney to withdraw from 
representation where the client “insists upon taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant.”60 Recent changes to the ABA Model Rules, which 
expand the circumstances when a lawyer may breach client confidentiality, 
illustrate the complexity of the lawyer’s role.61 Certain states, such as New 
Jersey, go farther than the Model Rules and require lawyers to disclose 
information to prevent a client “from committing a criminal, illegal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death 
or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of another.”62 
Studies suggest that attorneys do not take this language completely 
seriously. Particularly with regard to financial injury, only a small 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future 
Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2003); see HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 65 (noting 
that attacks have been mounting against lawyers over the past several years); Dan Ackman, 
Enron: Now the Recriminations, FORBES, Nov. 30, 2001, available at www.forbes.com/ 
2001/11/30/1130 topnews.html; see also Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 
920 (D.D.C. 1990) (asking why lawyers did not speak up or disassociate themselves from illegal 
transactions); Transcript of Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC, 
Remarks Before the 2004 Investment Company Institute Securities Law Developments 
Conference (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604smc.htm; David J. 
Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the 
Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 874 (2003); 
Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the Energy Giant’s Collapse Could Trigger 
Changes in the Law That Make it Easier to Snare Professionals, 88 A.B.A. J. 40, 44–45 (April 
2002); Symposium Panel, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate 
Attorney’s New Role, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (2003). 
 59. MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003). 
 60. Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).  
 61. Before 2003, the Model Rules provided that client information could not be revealed, 
without the client’s consent, unless necessary “to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm” or “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer . . . .” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (amended 2003). In 2003, the ABA amended its rules in accordance with 
changes recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission. Revised Rule 1.6 differs from the old rule 
in two ways. A lawyer now can reveal confidential information if necessary “to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm” or “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests . . . of another.” Id. R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003). After some debate, the 
ABA determined that the rule would be permissive; disclosure is not required. See Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 2003 Changes to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 38–39 (2003). 
 62. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006). 
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percentage of lawyers make the required disclosure.63 This is not surprising 
as the overall role of the lawyer is to promote the aims and objectives of his 
client. The unwillingness to make such disclosures is consistent with the 
insights from behavioral psychology, explored below. As one writer noted, 
“In the law, bias is a professional obligation.”64 While lawyers are 
occasionally found liable for wrongdoing, the facts of those cases are 
generally egregious.65 
While this paper places lawyers in the dependent gatekeeper class, 
occasionally one hears that lawyers must be independent. What does 
independence mean in this context? Geoffrey Hazard has distilled a 
lawyer’s independence to four principles: independence from the state, 
independence from improper relationships (including other clients and 
colleagues), independence from personal views regarding politics or 
morality, and independence from the client.66 This last principle warrants a 
closer look because if lawyers are supposed to be independent of their 
clients, then they would fall into the category of other independent 
gatekeepers, like auditors. 
A lawyer’s independence from the client, however, is different from the 
auditor’s or analyst’s independence. Hazard explains that a lawyer’s 
independence from the client means forbearing from assisting a client in 
violating the law or from rendering advice that encourages a violation.67 
Such conduct ultimately would harm the client and be tantamount to a 
violation of the duty of loyalty. Independence in this special sense, 
therefore, is better described as a corollary of the duty of loyalty, not 
opposed to it.68 A lawyer also is said to be morally independent from his 
client in the sense that while the lawyer acts on behalf of the client, the 
actions and responsibilities of the two are distinct.69 Moral independence in 
that regard does not detract from the thesis of this paper; it supports it 
because it demonstrates that lawyers, as zealous advocates, make arguments 
that they may feel uncomfortable making on their own behalf. 
The lawyer’s role as gatekeeper is clearest when giving legal opinions; 
it is there one should look to determine whether a lawyer is independent of 
his client. A legal opinion is an informed judgment, usually reduced to 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients 
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 129–30 (1994). 
 64. PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 55 (1998). 
 65. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 
1450–52 (D. Ariz. 1992) (explaining that Jones Day provided opinion letter despite evidence it 
knew Lincoln backdated files, destroyed documents, and violated regulations). 
 66. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 16, at 147. 
 67. Id. at 159. 
 68. Id. at 116 (“A corollary of the principle of independence is the virtue of loyalty to client.”). 
 69. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 508–09 (1994). 
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writing, on discrete legal issues.70 An opinion generally provides the 
recipient with the lawyer’s judgment on how a particular court would 
resolve a discrete issue.71 Lawyers provide opinions to clients and non-
clients on a number of matters that allow a transaction to go forward.72 In 
giving an opinion, the lawyer does not function as a conventional advocate. 
Rather, the goal of the opinion giver should be to fairly and accurately 
provide a legal conclusion based on the relevant facts.73 When a lawyer 
gives an opinion and he knows or has reason to know that a third person is 
likely to rely on it, the lawyer owes the third person a duty of reasonable 
care.74 
The lawyer’s responsibility to a third person when preparing an opinion 
is in tension with his responsibility to his client.75 The lawyer as opinion-
giver is not completely objective for several reasons. First, a lawyer 
rendering an opinion often serves a dual role as opinion-giver and engineer 
of the transaction about which he is opining.76 In that sense, the lawyer is 
passing on his own work, which, as discussed, is prohibited for the 
independent auditor.77 Second, opinions typically are negotiated documents 
whose terms are agreed in advance of the consummation of a transaction.78 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions et al., Legal 
Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 1891, 1896 (1979). 
 71. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions: A Report of the TriBar Opinion Committee, 53 BUS. 
LAW. 591, 595–96 (1998). 
 72. In public offerings, an underwriting agreement often will require outside counsel to give a 
negative assurance that nothing has come to counsel’s attention to lead them to believe that the 
registration statement or the prospectus is materially misleading. CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & 
JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 102 (3d ed. 2004).  
SEC Regulation S-K requires an “opinion of counsel as to the legality of the securities being 
registered.” See Item 601(b)(5) to Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2006). In the case of 
private transactions, lawyers for broker-dealers often provide an opinion setting forth certain risk 
factors and the process the broker used to review the issuer’s offering memorandum, which the 
broker-dealer then uses in its sales efforts. JEANNE M. CAMPANELLI & BRADLEY J. GANS, 
SECURITIES OFFERINGS; THE MECHANICS OF 144A/REGULATION S UNDERWRITINGS, WHAT 
ISSUERS’ & UNDERWRITERS’ COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW NOW (2001) (explaining that opinion 
recites investigatory process of issuer and offering memo that counsel undertook and gives 
negative assurance that following investigation nothing changed). 
 73. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 n.63 (2005). 
 74. See JAY M. FEINMAN, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES 99 (2000). 
 75. See id. at 100. 
 76. Griffith, supra note 2, at 1225 (“[L]awyers not only pass judgment, as gatekeepers, on the 
validity of transactions, they also exercise a significant degree of authorship over those 
transactions.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 152 cmt. 
c (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (stating that in opinion-giving role, lawyer must provide a “fair 
and objective opinion”). 
 77. Qualifications of accountants, 17 CFR § 210.2-01(b) (2006) (Preliminary Note) (“[T]he 
Commission looks in the first instance to whether a relationship or the provision of a service . . . 
places the accountant in the position of auditing his or her own work.”); see also Griffith, supra 
note 2, at 1225 (“The conflict between lawyer-as-gatekeeper and lawyer-as-transaction engineer 
thus parallels the conflict between accountant-as-auditor and accountant-as-consultant.”). 
 78. See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 72, at 103. 
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Third, unlike an audit, a legal opinion is considered one aspect of 
counseling a client who has requested that the lawyer provide the opinion to 
a third party.79 As Steven Schwarcz notes, lawyers should have the right to 
issue opinions to facilitate lawful transactions. They should not be expected 
to assess the overall legality of the transaction.80 Finally, an opinion does 
not give rise to a lawyer-client relationship with the third-party recipient.81 
Even those who advocate a more robust gatekeeping role for lawyers 
rendering legal opinions concede that opinion givers are not independent in 
the same sense as auditors.82 
b. Securities Underwriters 
An investment bank acting as an underwriter in a public securities 
offering plays an important gatekeeping role but, as we shall see, the 
underwriter is a dependent gatekeeper in many respects. This may be 
surprising because the underwriter is said to play a special role as the only 
participant who, as to matters not certified by the auditor, has the 
background and knowledge to conduct a sufficient investigation to protect 
the investor.83 Section 11 of the Securities Act names the underwriter, 
unlike the lawyer, as a potential defendant in a private lawsuit if a 
registration statement is misleading.84 Section 11 also provides a due 
diligence defense to the underwriter, who must undertake a “reasonable 
investigation” to assure itself that statements made in the registration 
statement are true.85 The underwriter must perform this responsibility on its 
own. It cannot rely on information provided by the issuer.86 “Tacit reliance 
on management assertions is unacceptable; the underwriters must play 
devil’s advocate.”87 Thus, there is a sense in which the underwriters are 
acting independently of the issuer to perform the due diligence required by 
the Securities Act. The role of the underwriter, however, is more complex. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on due diligence, the underwriter is not 
meant to be wholly independent of the issuer in the same way the auditor is 
independent. The issuer engages the underwriter to promote the distribution 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, supra note 71, at 596. 
 80. See Schwarcz, supra note 73, at 33 (analyzing lawyers’ duties in rendering opinions in 
structured finance transactions). 
 81. Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, supra note 71, at 596. 
 82. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 59 (“[T]he attorney’s role in this special context of third-party 
opinions is fundamentally that of a gatekeeper—a role that is midway between that of the attorney 
as advocate and that of the auditor.”). 
 83. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Feit 
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
 84. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (2000). 
 85. Id. § 77k(b)(3). 
 86. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 87. WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (quoting Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 582). 
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of its securities.88 In that regard, the underwriter’s role, as an adviser to the 
issuer, usually predates the offering itself. In many cases, the managing 
underwriter provides advice on a number of issues pertinent to the offering, 
such as the type and amount of securities sold, the timing of the offer, and 
steps the issuer can take to make itself more attractive.89 As a result of 
advice given, some courts have begun to recognize a fiduciary relationship 
between an underwriter and an issuer.90 
In addition, an underwriter often has a direct or indirect financial 
interest in an offering. Some underwriters invest directly in their clients,91 
which is prohibited for independent accountants.92 Also, many 
underwritings are performed on a so-called best efforts basis where the 
underwriter will not receive a fee unless some or all of the securities are 
sold.93 In a recent Second Circuit case, the court summarized the 
underwriter’s incentives as follows: 
Underwriters have strong incentives to manipulate the IPO [initial public 
offering] process to facilitate the complete distribution and sale of an 
issue. Underwriting is a business; competitive forces dictate that 
underwriters associated with successful IPOs will attract future issuers. 
Moreover, because underwriters assume a large measure of risk in the 
event an IPO fails, they have a direct interest in the IPO’s success.94 
Moreover, underwriters perform multiple services for their clients. 
Performance of such services, notwithstanding the due diligence respons-
                                                                                                                 
 88. Even where the issuer does not engage an underwriter, but one simply acts for the benefit 
of an issuer in furtherance of a distribution, that person is considered an underwriter. In the case of 
SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, an association, which helped the Chinese 
government during a bond offering in soliciting and receiving funds from Chinese communities in 
the United States, was considered an underwriter although it had no contractual relationship with 
the issuer. SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1941). 
Similarly, promoters, officers, and control persons who promote an offering are generally 
considered underwriters as well. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 351–52 (5th ed. 2006). 
 89. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 120–21. 
 90. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the underwriting agreement for an IPO 
did not itself create a fiduciary duty, the advisory relationship between the underwriter and the 
issuer was marked by trust and confidence and gave rise to a fiduciary relationship. EBC I, Inc. v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31–33 (N.Y. 2005) (“eToys hired Goldman Sachs to give 
it advice for the benefit of the company, and Goldman Sachs thereby had a fiduciary obligation to 
disclose any conflict of interest concerning the pricing of the IPO.”); see also Breakaway 
Solutions, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. Civ. A. 19522, 2004 WL 1949300, at *13 (Del. 
Ch., Aug. 27, 2004) (holding that issuer sufficiently alleged fiduciary relationship with its 
description of relationship with defendant underwriters). 
 91. Royce de Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest—Does Gatekeeping 
Work?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 859, 862 (2005) (“[Investment banks] may, and occasionally do, have 
financial interests in an issuer or a securities offering in addition to receipt of underwriting fees.”). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1)(i)(A) (2006) (stating that an accounting firm is not independent 
if firm or immediate family member has “any direct investment in an audit client”). 
 93. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 121–22. 
 94. Billings v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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bility under section 11, distinguishes underwriters from auditors and makes 
them dependent in a way that auditors now cannot be. Unlike auditors, 
which are restricted in the performance of non-audit services, underwriters 
continue to have an interest in cultivating the client relationship to obtain 
additional consulting and other work.95 The very provision of advice can 
turn a non-fiduciary relationship into a fiduciary one by dint of reliance by 
the principal on the skills and expertise of the agent and the trust and 
confidence reposed in him.96 
Application of National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules 
demonstrates an underwriter is a dependent gatekeeper. NASD rules require 
its members, in some cases, to hire an independent agent (known as a 
qualified independent underwriter) to conduct due diligence on a 
registration statement and provide an independent pricing opinion.97 If a 
conventional underwriter were independent, the NASD rules would be 
superfluous.98 
This Part demonstrates that all gatekeepers are not alike. Some, like 
auditors, are meant to be independent of their clients. Others, like attorneys, 
are dependent on the goals and objectives of their clients and often serve in 
a fiduciary capacity. Part II explores aspects of social and behavioral 
psychology with a view to determining whether these differences bear on 
how gatekeepers are likely to behave. Drawing on these insights, Part III 
discusses how dependent gatekeepers, charged with furthering the interests 
of their clients, are less likely to be effective gatekeepers than independent 
ones, and what we should do about it. 
II. GATEKEEPER MOTIVATION AND BIAS 
Intuition tells us that a dependent gatekeeper will be ineffective. The 
dependent gatekeeper faces a dilemma. He can act as a weak monitor, 
enhancing his potential liability, but preserving his client relationship and 
positioning himself for future business. Alternatively, he can act as a robust 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 88, at 125. 
 96. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381–82 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 97. See NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2710, Corporate Financing Rule—
Underwriting Terms and Agreements (2006); NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2720, 
Distribution of Securities of Members & Affiliates—Conflicts of Interest (2006); see also 24 
WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES PUB. & PRIV. OFFERINGS § 5:25 (June 2006); 1 HAROLD S. 
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 19:22 (2006). 
 98. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Corporate Financing Rule 
and Shelf Offerings of Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,731, 70,735 (proposed Feb. 4, 2004) (setting 
forth rules governing an underwriter participating in distribution of securities of issuer with which 
it has conflict of interest); see also Amendments to the Corporate Financing Rule, NASD NOTICE 
TO MEMBERS 04-13, Feb. 2004, at 114, available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/ 
documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_003258.pdf (noting that NASD member firms have 
expanded services provided to corporate financing clients including “venture capital investment, 
financial consulting, commercial lending, hedging risk through derivative transactions, and 
investment banking”). 
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monitor, shielding himself from potential liability, but possibly damaging 
his client relationship and acting inconsistently with his fiduciary duty.99 
Liability for breach of fiduciary duty could be overcome by fiat. 
Congress or regulators could draft laws or rules to trump state common law 
and limit liability for certain violations of the duty of loyalty. The same 
result might be achieved through contract, although such terms could be 
difficult to negotiate and enforce. The SEC’s attorney conduct rules, which 
require lawyers to report violations of law “up the ladder” in the business 
organization, was a partial measure in this regard. In adopting the rules, the 
SEC reaffirmed that they “shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent 
laws of a state or other United States jurisdiction in which an attorney is 
admitted or practices.”100 While the rules are controversial, the ABA 
recognized that federal law may provide a basis for the pre-emption of 
attorney-client confidentiality.101 
Even if such protections are available, open-ended responsibilities 
placed on fiduciaries to act as gatekeepers are unlikely to be effective. One 
reason for this, Part I demonstrates, is that a dependent gatekeeper should 
be committed to furthering the goals of his principal. This part explores a 
related reason, namely whether a gatekeeper’s decision making process in 
determining whether to act in a way that could harm his principal is con-
strained by unconscious bias. This Part begins with a short discussion of 
how conventional analysis has failed and why incorporating lessons from 
behavioral and social psychology is essential. 
A. FAILURES OF CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The primary failure of the traditional analysis of gatekeeper liability is 
that it did not sufficiently consider the dynamics of the group. People are 
motivated to act in the way they do out of biases deeper than an urge to 
maximize their wealth, reputation, or another measure of well-being. They 
are concerned about many other factors, such as how they are perceived by 
peers, and they make decisions in many cases based on what will be accept-
able to the group. Moreover, most people stick to their decision, even if the 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Acting as a robust gatekeeper may be inconsistent with the duty of care, by failing to 
further the principal’s objectives, and inconsistent with the duty of loyalty, by acting against the 
principal’s interests. Griffith, supra note 2, at 1234 n.43 (stating that vague duties “to ‘the public’ 
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 100. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act 
Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 n.7 (Feb. 6, 2003); Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General 
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Washington State Bar Association (July 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
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 101. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Assoc. to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Sec’y, SEC (December 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s74502/apcarlton1.htm. 
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decision turns out to be wrong-headed, long after they figure that out. These 
group dynamics, however, are only now getting significant attention in the 
literature regarding gatekeeper reform.102 
Focus on the individual, as opposed to the group, pervades our system 
of justice. Our system determines the guilt of an individual actor.103 This is 
consistent with the emphasis in corporate law on discrete rational indivi-
duals acting to maximize their own wealth.104 Ignoring group dynamics, 
however, is inconsistent with the way individuals operate in a business 
environment. This observation is not new. Law and economics scholars, 
often criticized by proponents of social psychology, recognized long ago 
that the nature of the corporation could be best understood by placing the 
individual into the group and recognizing the role of the individual within 
it.105 Ignoring group dynamics leads one back to a rational actor model of 
individualized action and stresses a “bad apples” approach to understanding 
corporate wrongdoing.106 It deemphasizes the influence one person or group 
of persons has on another, such as the interaction of a board of directors or 
the relationship between and among gatekeepers and their principals. This 
de-emphasis elides the complicated causes of misbehavior and may prevent 
meaningful reform. 
Second, analysts of gatekeeper liability have ignored certain root causes 
of corruption. Corruption can begin with certain small steps that “have their 
origins in actions that are not themselves corrupt.”107 Small or insignificant 
actions can spread within an organization with each subsequent actor 
rationalizing that his or her conduct is not much different from conduct that 
preceded it. If this is correct, wrongdoing cannot be alleviated in large 
organizations by screening out individuals deemed corrupt.108 The problems 
are deeper because many or most people are susceptible to the kinds of 
actions they ultimately might brand as wrong. And even if one is not 
susceptible to committing an action that could be considered corrupt in 
hindsight, conventional analysis has not accounted for how loyalty in an 
organization can cause some persons to fail to question others. 
A related, frequently ignored concern is the haste with which individual 
decisions in large organizations are often made. This phenomenon is 
masked by the time it takes for tangible results to be achieved, such as the 
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introduction of a new product or service.  But hundreds or thousands of 
smaller decisions are made within an organization for the tangible result to 
be achieved, often with little or no reflection. John Darley has explained 
that improper decisions “may be overridden by the more deliberate thinking 
of the reasoning system, but only if something triggers that system into 
action.”109 
Third, in addressing gatekeepers’ behavior, ideas of agency cost theory 
and the nexus-of-contracts approach are overemphasized. This approach 
focuses on purported contractual relationships, such as the relationship 
between an individual director and the corporation. It recognizes that a 
director’s interests may diverge from the shareholders’ and it considers 
ways shareholders can ensure that a director’s interests are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. Under this view, a manager or director’s fiduciary 
duty is nothing more than a safeguard to ensure he makes the right 
decisions on behalf of investors, as the residual claimants of the firm.110 The 
individualism characteristic of the contractualist view, however, is incon-
sistent with board experience and fails as an explanatory theory of the 
recent business failures.111 
Finally, conventional analysis remains largely wedded to a “command 
and control” (as opposed to a self-regulatory) model of corporate gover-
nance. Where a command and control model relies on external sanctions 
and rewards, a self-regulatory model relies on shaping employees’ internal 
motivations.112 Behavioral and social psychologists have shown that people 
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are not profit maximizers.113 As a result, external sanctions and rewards 
often are not effective strategies for influencing behavior.114 
B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Lessons from the fields of social and behavioral psychology address 
many of these shortcomings. Social psychology bridges the fields of 
psychology, which emphasizes the mental processes and behavior of the 
individual, and sociology, which emphasizes social structure, social 
institutions and processes, and human interaction. In general terms, social 
psychology addresses the influences people have on the beliefs and 
behavior of others.115 Much of the work in this area focuses on an 
individual’s behavior in a social environment and motivations that affect 
the individual’s decision making.116 It is a broad field with, by one count, 
some 600 theories to explain human behavior.117  
The research suggests that unconscious bias can affect gatekeeper 
decisions. Social psychology teaches that goals and motives influence 
reasoning—the way people process information—and the judgments they 
make.118 Motives affect reasoning by inducing people to rely on a biased set 
of cognitive processes that reflect the goals we seek to achieve. Cognitive 
processes that can become corrupted include the way one accesses infor-
mation and the way one constructs and evaluates beliefs.119 
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Gatekeeper decisions also can be biased because of a related reliance on 
heuristics, which are shortcuts or rules of thumb we use all the time to aid 
decision making. Most work in the area of heuristics and biases concerns 
facts. Heuristics, however, also are used in moral and legal decision 
making.120 By utilizing heuristics, one can avoid the hard cognitive work of 
receiving, understanding, and interpreting complex information and ana-
lyzing the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action.121 Heuristics 
work well most of the time, but not always.122 They fail us when a general-
ization that results from a heuristic is taken out of context and used as a 
universal principle where it no longer applies.123 
C. REDUCING DISSONANCE  
Psychologists explain that goals and motives influence reasoning 
because people seek to maintain consonance between relevant cognitions. 
The lack of consonance, or dissonance, produces pressure to avoid situa-
tions and information that increase the dissonance. One type of dissonance 
is post-decisional dissonance, which arises where a person must choose 
between two alternatives with positive and negative features.124 Most 
people typically choose the alternative that will result in less, not more, 
dissonance after the decision is made. In making such decisions, research 
demonstrates that reasoning can be driven by accuracy goals on the one 
hand or directional goals on the other. When one has accuracy in mind, the 
motive is to arrive at an accurate conclusion. When one has a directed goal 
in mind, the motive is to arrive at a particular conclusion. Accuracy goals 
yield better reasoning; directional goals yield strategies intended to reach 
the conclusion desired.125 
The distinction between accuracy goals and directional goals goes to 
the core of the difference between independent and dependent gatekeepers 
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discussed in Part I. Independent gatekeepers should be concerned with 
accuracy. They owe duties of objectivity and accuracy to the public. They 
should not be motivated by the clients’ goals and ends in the same way that 
dependent gatekeepers are. Dependent gatekeepers, by contrast, are inter-
ested in reaching a particular result. A dependent gatekeeper, as discussed 
in Part I, must act for the client’s benefit, furthering its ends and presenting 
the client in “the most favorable possible light.”126 
D. MOTIVATIONAL GOALS 
This section discusses mechanisms that result in thought processes to 
reduce dissonance that are closely related to accuracy versus directional 
goals that arise in the context of group dynamics. The focus is on two 
mechanisms—accountability and commitment—that are likely to bear on 
gatekeepers’ decisions, and that likely bear differently on dependent and 
independent gatekeepers as well as related heuristics that may lead to bias. 
1. Accountability 
a. The Perils of Accountability in Decision Making 
Generally, accountability refers to an expectation to justify one’s 
beliefs, feelings, or actions to others.127 Accountability enhances accuracy 
because people who are held accountable will avoid making arbitrary or 
incorrect decisions. Politicians, teachers, supervisors, and colleagues are 
often called upon to be more accountable. Failure to provide sufficient 
justification for a decision can result in negative consequences. Providing 
compelling justifications results in positive ones.128 
But researchers have uncovered a negative side to accountability as 
well. Accountability in some cases can negatively affect the formation of 
attitudes and the accuracy of judgments.129 One way to understand account-
ability is that it acts as a constraint on everything we do.130 Constraint 
caused by accountability can lead people to censure particular views and to 
short-circuit their decision process, omitting important considerations.131 
We short-change accuracy goals for the sake of directional goals. Students, 
for example, are asked to complete evaluations of faculty anonymously to 
ensure that the students will not be held accountable. Imagine how 
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inaccurate evaluations would be if we told students they must affix their 
signature and justify their beliefs to the faculty they are evaluating. 
This example suggests that the effect of accountability on accuracy 
differs depending on whether the views of the audience to whom one is 
accountable are known or unknown to the decision maker. In the example, 
the views of the audience (the faculty) are known to the decision maker (the 
student) because the student would be justifying her evaluation to the same 
faculty she is rating. People generally are motivated to seek approval from 
their audience and are biased in favor of conclusions that conform to the 
audience’s views. When the views of the audience are known to the 
decision maker before she forms an opinion, she will redirect her opinion to 
conform to them. Directional goals take over. People adopt positions that 
are likely to be pleasing to those to whom they are accountable. 
When the audience’s views are unknown, conformity is not possible 
and accuracy goals predominate. In that case, people are more likely to 
consider multiple objectives and engage in a more thoughtful, deliberate, 
self-critical analysis.132 As Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock explain, 
“When participants expect to justify their judgments [to an unknown 
audience], they want to avoid appearing foolish in front of the audience. 
They prepare themselves by engaging in an effortful and self-critical search 
for reasons to justify their actions.”133 Thus, in our example, accountability 
could promote accuracy if we held students accountable to an independent 
board whose views about the faculty were unknown. 
Closely related to the motivation to conform one’s views to those of a 
known audience is what psychologists call the acceptability heuristic. 
Adopting the position of one’s audience circumvents hard cognitive work. 
Studies demonstrate that when participants were unaware of the audience’s 
views, they engaged in more complex information processing.134 When one 
expects to discuss one’s views with an audience whose views are known, 
one will shift attitudes toward those of the audience, even if the results are 
inefficient.135 People do this in several ways. One possibility is to rely on 
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irrelevant information in making a decision. In one study, when asked to 
predict grade point averages of a student audience, participants who were 
accountable short-circuited their reasoning and relied on irrelevant 
information, such as the number of plants a student keeps, as opposed to the 
number of hours the student studied.136 This allowed the participants to pur-
sue their directional goals—predicting high GPAs—at accuracy’s expense. 
b. Accountability and Gatekeeper Bias 
How do accountability and audience views bear on decisions made by 
independent and dependent gatekeepers? Independent gatekeepers should 
be accountable to an audience whose views are unknown. The audience for 
independent gatekeepers, such as auditors and analysts, is a diverse public 
with heterogeneous views. Financial statements, for example, are necessary 
not only for management to get a complete snapshot of the company’s 
affairs, but also for use by creditors, suppliers, analysts, employees, com-
petitors, and, perhaps most importantly, public investors. While some of 
these may wish to see a clean opinion from an auditor or a “buy” recom-
mendation from an analyst, others may want the opposite. Empirical studies 
of auditors confirm that when audience views were known, auditors were 
animated by directional goals and conformed their conclusions to them. 
When the views were unknown, auditors were accuracy-oriented and 
engaged in a more deliberative process.137 
While an auditor may be retained by the issuer, it must conduct itself 
independently of the issuer. As Robert Haft has explained, “[T]here is a 
greater tendency for courts to decide that a duty to disclose material facts to 
nonclient investors exists for accountants than for attorneys . . . .”138 
Similarly, analysts should be independent of the companies they research 
and should present the company to the public in an objective fashion. These 
gatekeepers cannot know the views of their audience as the audience 
comprises public investors. 
Dependent gatekeepers, by contrast, are accountable to an audience 
whose views are known, the clients who hired them. The lawyer’s primary 
audience is his client; the same is true for an underwriter. As discussed in 
Part I, dependent gatekeepers advocate on their clients’ behalf and, in some 
cases, owe them fiduciary duties. The dependent gatekeeper is charged with 
furthering the client’s goals, which the gatekeeper appreciates and 
understands because the purpose of his engagement is to promote those 
                                                                                                                 
views of their audience “expressed more liberal views to the liberal audience and more 
conservative views to the conservative audience.” Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, supra note 121,  
at 638. 
 136. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 121, at 265. 
 137. See id. at 257. 
 138. ROBERT J. HAFT, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS § 6.01 (1995). 
2006] Differentiating Gatekeepers 143 
goals. Sung Hui Kim refers to lawyers’ “ethical ecology,” explaining that 
“alignment pressure can distort the lawyer’s judgments.”139 
Underwriters, while subject to section 11 liability, assume substantial 
risk if an offering fails. Thus, while the underwriter’s dependence may not 
be as clear at the lawyer’s, the underwriter faces alignment pressure just 
like the lawyer. By contrast, lawyers are exempt from section 11 liability—
Congress simply did not include them in the list of potential defendants. 
Moreover, lawyers generally are accountable to their clients, not third 
parties, for their legal opinions.140 As one court stated, “[T]he law, as a 
general rule, only rarely allows third parties to maintain a cause of action 
against lawyers for the insufficiency of their legal opinions.”141 The com-
ment to the relevant section in the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers explains, “Making lawyers liable to nonclients, moreover, could 
tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. Hence, a duty of 
care to nonclients arises only in . . . limited circumstances.”142 Thus, in the 
case of dependent gatekeepers, the views of the audience are known and the 
gatekeeper has a strong desire to maintain views consistent with them. 
2. Commitment 
a. Commitment and Bias 
Once people commit to a course of action, they tend to escalate their 
enthusiasm. Even after it becomes clear that the disadvantages of pursuing a 
course of action outweigh the advantages, people refuse to let go. “Groups 
may stick to a consensus view, even in the face of changing information, 
because consensus assures them their assessment or decision is correct.”143 
Social psychology teaches that when an individual is a group member, 
committed to the purposes and tasks of the group, the task of the individual 
is to first become a “prototypical member of that group, and then help the 
group as best she can in reaching its goals.”144 Moreover, after committing 
to a decision, if called upon to justify the choice, people are highly 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Kim, supra note 9, at 1008. 
 140. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 601 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(citing Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988)). Lawyers can be liable to 
third parties if an opinion was prepared for a third party’s use or the lawyer knew or should have 
known a particular person would rely on it. Id. According to the Restatement, a lawyer owes a 
duty of care to third parties to the extent the lawyer or client “invites the nonclient to rely” on the 
opinion or other services, “the nonclient so relies[,]” and the nonclient is not “too remote from the 
lawyer to be entitled to protection.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 51(2)(a), (g) (2000). See generally FEINMAN, supra note 74, at 99 (stating that lawyer owes third 
party duty of reasonable care); see also Jay M. Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 31 TORT 
TRIAL & INS. L.J. 735, 756–60 (1996). 
 141. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1124. 
 142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. b (2000). 
 143. Khurana & Pick, supra note 111, at 1277. 
 144. Darley, supra note 106, at 1191. 
144 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
motivated to avoid self-criticism and justify their original decision. Studies 
show that subjects concern themselves with thinking up as many reasons 
they can for why they were right and their critics wrong.145 Psychologists 
refer to this as retrospective rationality146 or defensive bolstering.147 
The presence of commitment marks an important distinction between 
independent and dependent gatekeepers and between accuracy versus 
directional goals. Commitment to the interests of the principal is the 
cornerstone of the fiduciary relationship which, as discussed, describes the 
link between dependent gatekeepers and their principals. Dependent gate-
keepers, as fiduciaries, owe a duty of loyalty to their clients to act on their 
behalf. They are directed to advance the client’s lawful interests and must 
single-mindedly pursue those interests. The traditional model of lawyering 
often is referred to as the total commitment model.148 
To see how commitment might take hold, consider the role of 
gatekeepers in a securities offering. The process begins with the issuer who 
will look to an investment bank as a lead underwriter. The lead underwriter 
will investigate the issuer and decide whether to underwrite its securities. 
After the issuer and underwriter sign a letter of intent, the underwriter’s 
experts and its lawyers labor, along with the issuer and its attorneys, to 
understand the company from several perspectives and assess its future 
prospects. The effort is a joint commitment by the issuer, the underwriter, 
and their respective lawyers.149 They have a joint stake in seeing the project 
through; they share the same directional goal. This group dynamic is 
important to understanding gatekeeper behavior.150 The role of the auditor, 
however, is more circumscribed. The auditor, after undertaking its own 
investigation, issues a certificate under its name as to the accuracy and 
completeness of the financial statements—the goal is accuracy.151 
Commitment once established can affect decision making in several 
ways. Continuing with the example of an offering, it is likely that the 
decision to participate entails some dissonance because not all aspects of an 
engagement are likely to be positive and most transactions entail some risk. 
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After making decisions, one way people reduce dissonance is to reassure 
themselves they made the right choice by focusing on information that will 
lead them to that conclusion.152 Once a dependent gatekeeper has agreed to 
an engagement, he has committed himself to the client’s ends and is more 
likely to focus on positive aspects of the choice and downplay negative 
ones.153 
This commitment has important consequences. After executing an 
underwriting agreement, which generally occurs immediately before the 
offering closes, an underwriter must continually assess whether the pros-
pectus should be updated or revised so as to not be materially misleading. 
But since directional goals predominate over accuracy goals, an underwriter 
committed to the transaction has an incentive to filter information to avoid 
amending the registration statement with negative information, which 
would impede selling efforts.154 This was the context of the famous case of 
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.155 The court held that the appellants, 
including the underwriters, were under a duty to amend the prospectus to 
reflect developments that occur after the SEC declares the registration 
statement effective, and the failure to do so was a violation not only of the 
registration provisions, but also the anti-fraud provisions.156 
b. Commitment to Outcome Versus Process 
Recent research bridging accountability and commitment reinforces the 
negative relationship between commitment and accuracy. This line of 
research distinguishes outcome accountability from process accountability. 
Outcome accountability is accountability for the outcome of a decision; it is 
goal directed. Process accountability is accountability for the quality of the 
process used to arrive at a decision.157 Outcome accountability increases 
commitment to previous decisions about what the outcome should be and 
leads to defensive bolstering. Outcome-accountable subjects in decision 
making displayed what is known as more scatter (the presence of irrelevant 
judgments) than subjects who had to account for procedures, or subjects 
who were not accountable at all.158 
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Process accountability by contrast leads to a better decision making 
process, such as more consideration of alternatives and less self-
justification.159 If justification focuses on the process used to make 
judgments, then accountability can be helpful. Outcome accountability, 
however, had no beneficial effects whatsoever, and in fact was harmful 
compared to no accountability.160 The distinction between outcome and 
process accountability mirrors the distinction between directional goals and 
accuracy goals. 
The distinction between outcome and process accountability explains 
the rules in place with respect to gatekeepers discussed below, and it 
demonstrates the difference between them. Independent gatekeepers are not 
held accountable for outcomes in the same way dependent gatekeepers are. 
Special protections exist for independent gatekeepers—particularly audi-
tors—when the client disagrees with the outcome. It is difficult for a public 
company to terminate an auditor when the client disagrees with the out-
come. Terminating an auditor is a public event and must be reported on an 
SEC form designed to disclose certain material events at the time they 
occur.161 No such protections exist for lawyers. 
The dependent gatekeeper’s commitment to outcome is closely related 
to a heuristic called anchoring and adjustment. Anchoring and adjustment 
describes the phenomenon that, in making decisions, we begin with a start-
ing point and adjust our estimates upward or downward insufficiently 
relative to where we started. Insufficient adjustments result in bias. If a sale 
item costs $1 and the sign says “limit 10 per customer,” you are more likely 
to leave with seven or eight, although you need only one.162 Similarly, when 
executives forecast a project’s completion, they adjust the estimates based 
on new information, but they prepared the original estimates making their 
case for success, which skews subsequent forecasts toward optimism.163 
Dependent gatekeepers are likely to be more prone to bias through 
anchoring and adjustment than independent gatekeepers. Think again about 
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the offering example. The issuer and its lawyers are the ones who generally 
draft the initial version of a registration statement.164 In doing so, they are 
preparing a document they hope will result in a successful distribution. 
With the assistance of the underwriters, they come up with an initial draft 
that will then be adjusted based on comments from third parties and the 
SEC staff. It is the initial draft of the registration statement, however, that 
serves as the anchor, and any amendments must be justified as departures 
from the original. 
Accountants performing an annual audit or analysts researching a 
public company do not have the same anchors to contend with. They are not 
wedded to the issuer’s numbers. Under Auditing Standard No. 2, auditors 
must obtain independent evidence, employ professional skepticism, and use 
the work of others only in limited circumstances.165 The same is true for 
analysts. As opposed to using financial data provided by an issuer as an 
anchor, an analyst may choose instead to use industry averages against 
which to measure an issuer’s performance. In that regard, an underwriter 
may seek out analysts’ views, in the context of an offering, to learn of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the competition.166 
Given that dependent gatekeepers are accountable to their principals 
and committed to furthering their ends, careful consideration should be paid 
to how directional goals and bias may affect their decisions. One cannot 
ignore the powerful draw that motivations have on judgment and the 
unconscious bias that can result. Moreover, everyday heuristics like accept-
ability and anchoring can bias judgments as well. If gatekeepers’ decisions 
about whether to stop a transaction from going forward or report wrong-
doing to a third person were clear-cut, one would have little cause for con-
cern. Such decisions, however, are highly indeterminate. Part III addresses 
the indeterminate nature of such decisions and, drawing on Parts I and II, 
what to do about them. 
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III. REFORMING GATEKEEPER BIAS 
The observations in Parts I and II advance the understanding of gate-
keeper behavior. This Part considers recent and potential reforms. The dis-
cussion so far suggests two possible paths for reform. One path is to 
discount the work of dependent gatekeepers. To the extent they are charged 
with promoting their clients’ ends, as discussed in Part I, they are prone to 
directional goals as opposed to accuracy goals, as discussed in Part II, and 
destined to fail. This appears to be the path suggested by some commenters, 
who discuss shrinking the scope of underwriter liability.167 Another path is 
to expand the scope of liability of dependent gatekeepers precisely because 
of the biases discussed. 
The observations in Parts I and II regarding the differences among gate-
keepers and the tendency to self-justify are magnified because of indeter-
minacy in the law. One result of indeterminacy is that when one wants to 
reach a particular result, one often can reach it, and then defend the result as 
reasonable. This is not true to the same degree for independent gatekeepers. 
While auditors face some ambiguity in the course of an audit, as a general 
matter, auditors use relatively objective rules that contain few principles 
and standards leaving wide latitude for interpretation. If managers sought to 
improperly influence financial statements, Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) inhibit such conduct even if the auditors were willing to 
oblige.168 This Part, therefore, begins with a discussion of the indeterminacy 
inherent in the corporate and securities area. 
A. INDETERMINACY IN CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW 
Securities and corporate law is inherently ambiguous for a number of 
reasons. First, notwithstanding many technical provisions, the respon-
sibilities of issuers and market professionals often turn on state common 
law fiduciary duties—a notoriously ambiguous area of the law.169 This is 
particularly true for the duty of care, which is an open-ended requirement to 
exercise the care and skill of an ordinary prudent person.170 Courts, 
particularly in the corporate law area, recognize that the duty to pay 
attention to corporate matters is inherently ambiguous. In Barnes v. 
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Andrews, Judge Learned Hand remarked, “The measure of a director’s 
duties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting themselves with 
vague declarations, such as that a director must give reasonable attention to 
the corporate business.”171 The latitude inherent in the duty of care is 
embodied in the business judgment rule, which provides that, in the absence 
of fraud or bad faith, courts will not second guess directors’ decisions if 
they turn out badly.172 
1. Standard of Care 
The ambiguity of the duty of care renders the gatekeeper’s 
responsibilities highly indeterminate. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the 
underwriter (and others) can defend against a claim of liability if it 
conducted a “reasonable investigation” into the facts disclosed in the 
registration statement.173 There is little or no guidance, however, on what a 
reasonable investigation entails and few litigated cases have been decided 
on this point. The leading case, Escott v. BarChris Construction Company, 
is nearly 40 years old and, in that case, the court stated, “There is no direct 
authority on this question, no judicial decision defining the degree of 
diligence which underwriters must exercise to establish their defense under 
Section 11.”174 The court could not arrive at a rule: “It is impossible to lay 
down a rigid rule suitable for every case defining the extent to which such 
verification must go. It is a question of degree, a matter of judgment in each 
case.”175 More recent cases addressing whether due diligence should be 
decided by a judge or jury make the same point.176 In the end, the standard 
required for due diligence under the Securities Act is the vague duty of care. 
This standard is now codified in section 11(c) of the Act, which reads, “In 
determining . . . what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable 
ground for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a 
prudent man in the management of his own property.”177 
2. Materiality Requirement 
A second reason the law is hard to pin down is that at the heart of every 
disclosure requirement, and every claim of fraud under the securities laws, 
is a materiality requirement. The materiality standard turns on the 
following: 
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[Whether] there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote . . . . Put another way, 
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.178  
The standard is ambiguous. It depends on what a reasonable investor 
would decide, which is often dependent on how a particular judge or 
regulator views the facts.179 Attempts to quantify materiality or provide a 
bright-line rule have been rejected.180 The Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson rejected a bright-line rule to determine when merger negotiations 
would be considered material stating that “ease of application alone is not 
an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and Congress’ 
policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence 
as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as 
materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”181 
3. Form of Rules 
In addition to these substantive points, corporate and securities law is 
indeterminate because of the form of the rules themselves. First, securities 
regulation is often promulgated through standards as opposed to bright-line 
rules. The conventional distinction between rules and standards is that rules 
are clear cut and set forth the law ex ante whereas standards provide only 
general principles that judges can apply to a particular set of facts. Rules 
constrain judicial discretion more than standards.182 Yet standards are 
common in the securities area. A frequent criticism of the SEC is that it has 
always resisted bright-line rules to preserve flexibility in enforcement 
cases.183 The SEC in many cases refuses to adopt bright-line rules and 
instead provides factors that apply flexibly depending on the facts. In the 
due diligence context, for example, the Commission sought to provide 
guidance in Securities Act Rule 176. In doing so, however, the Commission 
only set out factors to be considered in a determination of whether due 
diligence was met.184 The rule is inconclusive, and the Commission 
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explicitly left the ultimate conclusion regarding the satisfaction of due 
diligence to the courts.185 
A second reason why the form of rules in the securities area leads to 
ambiguity is that litigation is rare. In many cases, rules are pronounced 
through settled enforcement cases, as opposed to through litigated cases or 
administrative rulemaking. The vast majority of SEC actions and many 
state law corporate cases, particularly in Delaware, are settled. A legal rule 
announced through a settlement necessarily lacks the level of specificity 
that would attend a decision after a litigated case on the merits with a fully 
developed record.186 Moreover, when cases do not settle, many are decided 
at a preliminary stage in the proceedings where, again, the record is not 
fully developed. Such opinions are likely to be more indeterminate than 
cases decided at a later stage in the proceedings when the record is 
complete.187 Finally, a settlement sidesteps the need for the government to 
articulate the legal theory on which the action is based and leaves potential 
questions about its precedential effects.188 
Indeterminacy has important implications for gatekeepers. Consider 
two examples of the kinds of decisions gatekeepers must make. First, under 
new SEC rules governing attorney conduct, the duty to report “up-the-
ladder” is triggered when the attorney “become[s] aware of evidence of a 
material violation” by the issuer, and material violation is defined as “a 
material breach of fiduciary duty.”189 The attorney, therefore, must interpret 
what constitutes “evidence,” what constitutes a “violation” and whether the 
violation is “material.” Since the definition of violation includes breach of 
fiduciary duty, the attorney is left to determine when a fiduciary breach has 
occurred.190 Second, in the context of public offerings, the underwriter must 
determine whether the registration statement “contained an untrue statement 
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of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated 
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”191 The 
underwriter therefore, must determine when a fact is “untrue,” whether it 
was “material,” or whether an omitted fact was “required” or necessary to 
make other statements “not misleading.” In these cases, the gatekeeper 
consciously or unconsciously may arrive at a conclusion acceptable to the 
client because of ambiguity in the law. 
Finally, it is important to distinguish the ex ante from the ex post 
perspectives when assessing gatekeepers’ conduct. One could always argue 
that, from an ex post perspective, gatekeepers’ actions or inactions were not 
appropriate because they assisted the client with an improper end. From an 
ex ante perspective, a dependent gatekeeper has other values to consider. 
One such value is client autonomy. The legal system accommodates 
individual autonomy by giving significant latitude for individual decision 
making above a floor of clear illegality.192 Dependent gatekeepers have 
multiple considerations in deciding whether to “report up” in the 
organization or force an issuer to make certain disclosures. As mentioned, 
federal securities laws do not require disclosure of all material information; 
disclosure is only required if an omission renders something that was said 
misleading. If the attorney discovers something wrong, it must not 
necessarily be disclosed.193 It is precisely in the vagary of trying to 
determine whether the omission is necessary to render other information not 
misleading that the gatekeeper’s biases are likely to take hold. 
B. GATEKEEPER REFORM 
1. Focus of Recent Reforms 
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms and their aftermath have accounted for 
some of the lessons from behavioral and social psychology. Discussions on 
the Senate floor suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Congress sought to go 
beyond an approach of punishing individual wrongdoers. Senator Sarbanes 
stated: 
The bad apples ought to be punished. There is no question about it.  
They ought to be punished severely. But it is very clear, as this issue has 
unfolded, that we need to make structural changes. We need to change the 
system so that the so-called gatekeepers are doing the job they are 
supposed to be doing. That has not been happening. That is why we need 
to remove these conflicts of interest on the part of auditors who are also 
consultants for the same company, collecting huge fees. And they  
are supposed to come in as outside auditors and be very tough on  
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the company, which at the same time is giving them large fees for 
consultancy . . . . We have to put in place a framework, a system which 
tightens up and begins to screen out these things.194 
The new framework departs from the “command and control” model 
mentioned above. While one cannot force a change in attitudes, Congress 
and regulators attempted to make compliance a priority. Much of the 
emphasis in reform over the past five years has been enhancing policies and 
procedures to ensure compliance and getting information into the hands of 
the persons making decisions. The 2004 changes to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines set forth what organizations must do to have an effective 
compliance and ethics program. The changes respond to requirements in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which directed the Sentencing Commission to review 
and amend its guidelines to ensure they are sufficient to deter and punish 
criminal misconduct.195 Under the revised guidelines, company directors 
must be knowledgeable about the ethics program, and they must receive 
reports “on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.”196 
Similarly, according to the SEC, “Companies also must have internal 
communications and other procedures to ensure that important information 
flows to the appropriate collection and disclosure points on a timely 
basis.”197 
In the area of mutual funds and investment advisers, the SEC now 
requires codes of ethics198 and compliance programs, including the 
appointment of a chief compliance officer.199 In adopting these rules, the 
SEC observed that compliance failures have occurred when service 
providers to a mutual fund deny information to the board or provide 
incomplete information because complete disclosure would harm the 
service providers’ own interests. Under the rules, the chief compliance 
officer is “responsible for keeping the board apprised of significant 
compliance events at the fund or its service providers and for advising the 
board of needed changes in the fund’s compliance program.”200 The SEC’s 
lawyer rules, also mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, were intended to enhance 
the likelihood that companies will act at an early stage to remedy violations 
internally. “By mandating up-the-ladder reporting of violations, the rule 
helps to ensure that evidence of material violations will be addressed and 
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remedied within the corporation, rather than misdirected or ‘swept under 
the rug.’”201 The emphasis is less on sanctioning individualized improper 
conduct after it occurs and more on promoting structural changes to 
strengthen a culture of compliance and address problems at an earlier stage. 
2. Independent Gatekeepers 
a. Auditors 
Congress and federal regulators recognized that, in the case of auditors, 
the ties that bound auditors to their clients had to be severed. As Part II 
discussed, accountability to the client, whose views are known to the 
auditor, can result in an auditor redirecting his opinions to conform to the 
client’s views. People adopt positions that are likely to please others. By 
performing a significant volume of non-audit services for the audit client, 
the auditor had an overwhelming desire to please the client in the course of 
the audit itself and continue to generate non-audit business.  
The SEC recognized this conflict in its own administrative rules 
adopted before Sarbanes-Oxley and sought to insulate the auditor from 
improper influence. The SEC prohibited auditors from providing certain 
non-audit services, such as consulting services, to audit clients because the 
large fees generated by such services could jeopardize the auditor’s 
independence.202 The Commission stated that its rules were “designed to 
ensure that auditors are qualified and independent of their audit clients both 
in fact and in appearance.”203 “If investors do not believe that an auditor is 
independent of a company, they will derive little confidence from the 
auditor’s opinion and will be far less likely to invest in that public 
company’s securities.”204 The auditor, as an independent gatekeeper, must 
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resist an advocacy role, which characterizes dependent gatekeepers, like 
lawyers. In evaluating independence, SEC rules state, “The Commission 
looks in the first instance to whether a relationship . . . places the accountant 
in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.”205 
Sarbanes-Oxley went further than the SEC’s own independence 
requirements and prohibited auditors from providing eight categories of 
non-audit services, such as bookkeeping, actuarial, investment, and legal 
services.206 Sarbanes-Oxley also included a provision placing responsibility 
on the audit committee, which must be composed solely of independent 
directors, to be “directly responsible” for the appointment, evaluation, 
compensation and replacement of the independent auditor for a listed 
company.207 
Understanding the difference between independent and dependent 
gatekeepers illuminates the auditor’s role. The auditor serves to correct the 
biases of managers, who are themselves dependent gatekeepers. Managers 
are chosen by the board to further the ends of the corporation as a profitable 
enterprise to the benefit of the shareholders. Bias on the part of the 
managers is appropriate. Unchecked, however, such bias can lead to abuse. 
Thus, the bias of the dependent gatekeeper is held in check by the 
independent gatekeeper. 
Since the audit firm is compensated by the client, some argue it will 
always defer to the client to ensure future business.208 While this may be 
true to some degree, the requirement to report the termination of the auditor 
on Form 8-K reduces this risk. Moreover, this risk was far worse before the 
SEC’s auditor independence rules were adopted. The termination of a 
consulting agreement, unlike the termination of the auditor relationship, is 
not disclosed on Form 8-K. As a result, an issuer could quietly threaten to 
terminate a consulting agreement as a club to pressure the auditor to provide 
a clean audit.209 If the auditor were not performing non-audit services for 
the company, there would be no club.210 While the issuer could threaten to 
fire an auditor, that event is publicly disclosed and most companies resist 
making such a filing. The SEC’s auditor independence rules began to 
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address this concern by limiting the non-audit services that an auditor could 
perform for its audit client. 
One question in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley is whether auditor 
independence requirements have gone too far or not far enough. Above I 
discussed the need, with respect to independent gatekeepers, to counter the 
bonding that often characterizes a fiduciary relationship. Characteristics like 
trust and longevity can threaten independence. The Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), using rulemaking authority in 
section 103 of Sarbanes-Oxley, has gone further than Congress or the SEC 
in some respects. Under new rules, for example, a public accounting firm is 
not independent if it gives tax services to certain persons, such as members 
of management who fill a financial reporting oversight role at an audit 
client. Performing such services can create the appearance of a “mutual 
interest between the auditor and those individuals” and impair 
independence.211 
Should all non-audit services be banned? Sarbanes-Oxley now requires 
all non-audit services the auditor proposes to perform to be pre-approved by 
the issuer’s audit committee.212 With respect to certain tax services still 
permitted, the PCAOB has made the process more deliberate by requiring 
the auditor to play a role in seeking the audit committee’s pre-approval. The 
audit firm must describe to the audit committee, in writing, the nature of the 
services to be provided, discuss with the audit committee the effects on the 
auditor’s independence, and document the firm’s discussion.213 
Placing additional limits on non-audit services is consistent with 
addressing inappropriate bonding between issuers and auditors. Moreover, 
this specified deliberation is consistent with Darley’s discussion of 
addressing the small decisions that can grow into large scale corruption. By 
slowing the process and requiring the audit firm to describe, in writing, the 
services it seeks to perform and the effects on independence, it is unlikely 
that a series of quick decisions will be made by either the auditor or the 
issuer that will impair independence, at least with respect to tax services. 
Requiring the auditor to play a role in the issuer’s deliberation also is 
consistent with the overall program of enhancing policies and procedures 
that focus less on individualized wrongdoing and more on instituting 
compliance norms at both the audit firm and the issuer. 
One could consider requiring this sort of deliberative process for all 
non-audit services. The suggestion was put forward by certain commenters 
on the PCAOB’s rule, but the PCAOB determined to gather experience 
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with respect to tax services first.214 While gathering experience with respect 
to tax services is laudable, it may not be necessary if the PCAOB could 
obtain the information it needs from a separate request for comment. Indeed 
the tax services area is different from other areas of permissible non-audit 
services, so the PCAOB would likely have to publish a separate request for 
comment before applying the deliberation rule more broadly.215 Since the 
deliberation rule does not seem unduly burdensome and would likely have 
positive effects, the PCAOB may wish to consider such a request for 
comment at this time. 
b. Securities Analysts 
Securities analysts are subjected to new rules passed not only by 
Congress and the SEC, but also by state prosecutors, the self-regulatory 
organizations, and others—all with an eye toward ensuring independence. 
The concern, like in the case of auditors, was that the analysts were tied too 
closely with the issuers they were supposed to be researching. 
Congress sought to strengthen analyst objectivity in Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The law required new administrative rules restricting when the broker-
dealer arm of an underwriter engaging in a public offering can publish 
research on the security offered, and it required analysts to disclose certain 
conflicts.216 SEC rules now require analysts to include in a research report a 
certification stating that the opinions expressed in the report accurately 
reflect the analysts’ personal views, and that their compensation was not 
related to their recommendations.217 The touchstone for the SEC rule is 
independence. While the new rule applies to broker-dealer firms, the 
Commission has stated that the rule shall not apply to research performed 
by an affiliate of the broker-dealer with a “sufficient level of independence” 
from the firm. Those meeting this criteria should have “a sufficient level of 
independence so that pressures from the broker-dealer . . . should not 
compromise their research.”218 
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The securities analyst settlements entered into by ten large investment 
banking firms in 2003 contained regulatory requirements to help ensure 
“that research provided to investors is objective.”219 Similarly, the New 
York Stock Exchange brought actions against analysts for failing to 
establish procedures adequate to maintain independence.220 The Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SROs), namely the NYSE and NASD also have 
adopted rules barring investment banking departments from supervising 
analysts.221 An analyst’s compensation may not be tied to investment 
banking transactions, and new rules impose a 40-day cooling off period 
after an initial public offering before an analyst whose firm managed the 
offering can issue a report on the security. To guard against analysts making 
an overwhelming number of buy recommendations compared to sell 
recommendations, analysts must now disclose the distribution of buy, sell, 
and hold recommendations.222 The goal of these reforms has been to 
promote independence.223 In approving rules proposed by the SROs, the 
SEC made clear that the goal of independence has not been abandoned: 
The Commission believes that the SRO proposals are designed to promote 
the objectivity and independence of research analysts by explicitly 
requiring that all research analyst written and oral communications with 
customers, as well as with internal firm personnel, must be fair, balanced 
and not misleading, considering the context of the communications. These 
requirements build on existing SRO standards for research analyst 
communications with the public and provide additional safeguards for 
research communications with personnel within the broker-dealer.224 
These rules are designed to combat accountability to a known audience 
and enhance accuracy-based goals, discussed above. Certifying that an 
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analyst’s opinion represents his personal views helps ensure the analyst is 
not accountable to a third party, such as the issuer he is researching or the 
investment banking arm of the firm that employs him, which, acting as 
securities underwriter or strategic advisor, has its own directional goals in 
mind. 
Whether recent reforms have caused analysts to become independent 
once again is unknown. Evidence continues of retaliation and pressure on 
analysts from both company officials and institutional investors to avoid 
sell recommendations.225 Some have suggested that independent research 
departments will not survive because, without investment banking revenue, 
financial firms must pay securities analysts out of revenue obtained from 
trading commissions, which are not as lucrative as they once were.226 
In the meantime, the SEC, NASD, or others, could consider educating 
the public on how to interpret research calls or other information from sell-
side analysts, analysts who typically work for brokerage firms and generate 
research for the investing public. One should recognize that sell-side 
analysts have little incentive to issue a “sell” recommendation. Issuers 
generally do not like a “sell” recommendation because it might cause the 
stock to decline in value. Some evidence indicates that, in many cases, if 
enough analysts downgrade the stock, it can cost the CEO his or her job.227 
Similarly, most investors do not like a “sell” recommendation because they 
are “long” in the stock. Investors who already own shares also may not like 
a sell recommendation for the deeper reason that it could call into question 
their previous decision to buy and, as discussed, once people commit to a 
decision, they usually do not change their minds—even in the face of 
evidence to the contrary. 
The rule which now requires analysts to disclose the ratio of buy-to-sell 
recommendations is an important start toward educating the public on how 
to interpret analysts’ recommendations, but additional education is needed. 
Sell-side analysts, for example, are generally not compensated based solely 
on investment performance. Buy-side firms rate, and presumably pay, sell-
side analysts based on factors other than performance, including timeliness 
of information, responsiveness, innovation, and comprehensibility of 
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research reports.228 Additional education on some or all of these issues 
could be valuable to the public. 
3. Dependent Gatekeepers and Lawyer Certifications 
The problem of how to enhance the monitoring role of dependent 
gatekeepers is more intractable because of the reasons discussed in Parts I 
and II. Others have recognized that dependent gatekeepers play a role as 
advocate for a client, which is in tension with the role as gatekeeper.229 How 
does this tension arise? Because attorneys often are closely aligned with 
their clients in an “informal partnership” to accomplish their clients’ 
objectives, requiring attorneys to act as gatekeepers may place them in a 
situation where they are required to audit their own work.230 Similarly, once 
a client and an attorney have committed to a particular course of action, the 
attorney may be biased toward the client’s directional goals at the expense 
of accuracy and fail to put a halt to the course of action previously 
determined. 
John Coffee has suggested that the SEC could adopt a rule requiring a 
securities lawyer to certify that he has reviewed the non-financial disclosure 
in publicly filed reports, and that the attorney believes the statements are 
true and he is not aware of any material omissions.231 Such a certification, 
Coffee says, is consistent with certifications required of auditors, analysts, 
and senior officers, and it would simply fill a void for Exchange Act filings 
that is currently filled by standard negative assurance letters in the case of 
Securities Act filings.232 Moreover, the certification, according to Coffee, 
ideally would include a statement that the attorney undertook reasonable 
inquiry, which would establish a due diligence obligation.233 While this 
proposal has merit, it is narrow in scope because it would be limited to the 
relatively small group of lawyers who are principally responsible for 
preparing a document or report filed with the SEC. 
A more ambitious reform may be appropriate.  Congress in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was concerned about all “attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of 
issuers.”234 This language includes a larger group of attorneys than those 
principally responsible for preparing a document filed with the SEC. In 
adopting rules under this provision, the SEC defined the scope of appearing 
and practicing before the Commission as: (i) transacting any business with 
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the SEC; (ii) representing an issuer in any SEC investigation, inquiry, or 
request; (iii) providing securities laws advice regarding any document the 
attorney knows will be filed with the SEC; or (iv) advising an issuer on 
whether information, under the securities laws, must be filed with the 
SEC.235 Thus, the scope of the attorney conduct rules is relatively broad. 
One possible solution is to marry these two approaches and require an 
annual certification under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Under the SEC’s 
rules, an attorney appearing and practicing before the SEC already is 
subject to a reporting requirement. Under the SEC’s rule as adopted, an 
attorney who “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the 
issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer . . . [must] 
report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . or to both the 
issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief executive officer . . . forthwith.”236 
Thus, lawyers already have a clear obligation to make a report if they 
become “aware” of certain evidence. One possibility, therefore, is to require 
an annual certification to the SEC or the bar that a lawyer, covered by this 
rule, is either not aware of such evidence or has made the required report. 
This proposal should entail only modest tangible costs by attorneys 
(although it would likely result in emotional distress). Those appearing and 
practicing before the SEC already must make the determinations that would 
be required by a certification. Under current law, an attorney who is aware 
of evidence of a material violation must make a report of the evidence 
“forthwith.”237 For those attorneys who spend no time considering whether 
a report is needed, the proposal would require some action on their part. 
The SEC or state bar associations would of course incur costs in processing 
the certifications, which would have to be received and tracked on a regular 
basis. 
The proposal would have important salutary effects for at least four 
reasons. First, it would require securities lawyers, who are not yet aware of 
the requirements of section 307, to not only become aware, but to undertake 
the inquiry expected by the Act and the SEC’s rules. Second, requiring a 
certification would require securities lawyers to reflect on their current 
matters, and state of awareness, and deliberate over whether they could 
make the required certification or whether a “reporting up” was called for. 
This could be the triggering mechanism to which Darley refers when he 
indicates that improper decisions can be overridden by deliberate thinking if 
something can trigger the deliberate thinking into action.238 Third, the 
proposal would counter the biases that arise from the perils of account-
ability, discussed above. To the extent that the attorney is required to make 
a truthful, objective filing to a regulator or state bar, the attorney will 
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necessarily have accuracy and not directional goals in mind. Finally, 
requiring a certification would mean that an attorney, who violated the rule, 
would make a false filing, which is qualitatively different than failing to 
make any filing at all. I have discussed elsewhere the difference between a 
wrongful act on the one hand and a wrongful omission on the other, which 
some call “omission bias.”239 The prospect of making a false filing would 
likely have deterrent effects absent where the harm amounted to failing to 
make a filing. 
This proposal also is consistent with the rationale for CEO and CFO 
certifications required by Sarbanes-Oxley. That rationale, drawn from the 
1980 requirement for certain senior officers and a majority of the board to 
sign the annual report, is that people are more likely to pay attention to dis-
closures made in a report, and to participate more closely in the preparation 
of a report, if they have to sign them.240 
CONCLUSION 
Gatekeepers are not alike, and the distinction between independent and 
dependent gatekeepers is important to an understanding of gatekeeper 
behavior. Independent gatekeepers, like auditors and analysts, should criti-
cally evaluate a set of data and render an opinion for an unknown audience. 
Dependent gatekeepers, such as lawyers and underwriters, act on a client’s 
behalf providing advice and recommendations to a known audience—the 
client itself—in reaching its goals. Consequently, independent gatekeepers 
will be better monitors than dependent gatekeepers, and perform a more 
robust gatekeeper role. That conclusion is consistent with research in the 
area of social and behavioral psychology, which teaches that people’s 
behavior is influenced by others and that goals and motives can influence 
our thinking. Accountability to a known audience and commitment to a 
course of conduct can alter a rational evaluation of the facts. These 
phenomena appear more starkly in the case of dependent gatekeepers and 
are more likely to influence their behavior. 
The differences between independent and dependent gatekeepers, and 
the lessons from social and behavioral psychology, help explain many of 
the recent reforms for gatekeepers, including auditors and analysts. 
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Moreover, the same lessons can help with additional reforms in the case of 
dependent gatekeepers, such as lawyers. One tentative proposal that bears 
additional consideration is to require certifications to the SEC or state bar 
by securities lawyers stating positively that they are unaware of evidence 
that would necessitate a “reporting up” under the SEC’s lawyer rules. This 
affirmative obligation would combat the biases discussed in this paper and 
have other salutary effects. 
